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Resumen
Atrapados en las ambigüedades de la Realpolitik del sistema de Yalta, las sociedades
del Centro y Este de Europea han tenido que proceder a un largo camino de aprendizaje
a fin de encontrar formas correctas de autoorganización y la articulación de la defensa de
sus valores e identidades vis-à-vis con una dictadura y una administración autoritaria. Estas
amargas lecciones contribuyeron a la emergencia de una nueva «estrategia», una nueva vi-
sión materializada en la emergente filosofía política y la práctica social y política de la so-
ciedad civil. Este desarrollo no hubiera sido posible sin el gradual y fundamental cambio
en el pensamiento político y el establecimiento de metas, expresadas en el desarrollo de
un nuevo concepto de sociedad civil.
Palabras clave: sociedad civil global, Europa Central del Este, Democracia, ONG.
Abstract
Entrapped in the ambiguities of the Realpolitik of the Yalta system, East and Central
European societies had to proceed on a long path of learning in order to find the right
modes of self-organization and articulation to defend their values and identities vis-à-vis
dictatorship and authoritarian rule. These bitter lessons contributed to the emergence of a
new «strategy», a new vision which materialized in the emerging political philosophy and
the political and social practice of civil society. This development would not have been
possible without a gradual and fundamental change in political thinking and goal-setting,
expressed in the development of a new concept of civil society.
Key words: global civil society, East Central Europe, Democracy, NGO.
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Most authors agree that the meaning of the term «civil society» has
significantly changed since the end of the Cold War. According to Mary
Kaldor, the core of what is new in the concept since 1989 is globalization.
The prerequisite social contract between civil society and the state is seen
in the constitution of «a global system of rules, underpinned by overlapping
inter-governmental, governmental and global authorities» (Kaldor, 2003: 2).
The fact that no concensus can be reached on the definition of civil society,
its inherent ambiguity, says Kaldor, reveals one of its attractions.
Civil society can express itself in a large variety of forms, from
individual initiatives through social movements, clubs, associations,
societies and other organizations. It is never, however, a mechanical sum
total of existing or potential formations. To quote Fowler (1996: 25), «civil
society is the location from where legitimacy must be obtained if one is to
talk of a democratic political system». Civil society in this sense is more a
philosophical concept than a set of organizations.
It is the terrain of self-reflection, self-articulation and autonomy which
inherently presupposes and necessitates a self-organizing public arena,
where the critique, the control and containment of existing and prevailing
power-monopolies (i.e., the state, the army, the police, multinational
companies, intergovernmental institutions) can be practiced. Civil society
has to be seen as a potential, ad hoc melting pot and battleground of diverse
interests and actors, ranging from public individuals to international NGOs.
This public arena is not homogenous; it is constituted rather as a permanent
regrouping and renegotiating process between and among new and old
actors. Its non-constant social fabric and catalyzed interdependencies are
built on the autonomous and voluntary will of the individual who actively
takes part in social and political affairs. The uninterrupted social need for
civil society stems from democracy’s deficiencies. This special social space
or public arena assumes citizen participation in social processes as well as
a strong consciousness of being a citizen. This interrelatedness is correctly
emphasized in recent literature on civil society and NGOS.
Lars Jorgensen, for example, envisions civil society as a «meeting place
for debate and common endeavour», acknowledging that «the right of each
individual to participate in the workings of society, and the recognition
that periodical elections and referendums […] are not sufficient»
(Jorgensen, 1996: 36). Mary Kaldor suggests that «the advantage of the
language of civil society is precisely its political content, its implications
for participation and citizenship» (Kaldor, 1997: 23). In other words, there
is nothing stable or mechanistic about civil society, especially not as far as
«institutions» are concerned.
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Those who do take up the challenge of reframing the conceptual
discourse are conscious of the dangers of the lack of self-reflection on the
part of NGOS and the lack of conceptual clarity on the part of intellectuals
which has lead to confusion in practice.
Jenny Pearce (1993: 14) articulates the crucial consequences of the lack
of debate on fundamental issues:
There is no «correct» view of civil society, but there is an essential point to make about
the way the concept is used. The use of the term as a normative concept, i.e. what we
would like civil society to be or what we think it ought to be, is often confused with
an empirical description […] the constant slippage between the two in the development
literature and in the practice of multilateral agencies, governments, and NGOS has
contributed to a technical and depoliticising approach to the strengthening of civil
society which ultimately has had political implications. It has, for instance, mostly
privileged the vision of Western donor agencies and turned «civil society» into a project
rather than a process. In other words, by assuming that there is no debate around what
we would like «civil society» to be, assuming it is an unproblematic and empirically
observable given whose purpose is unquestionably to build democracy and foster
development, the vision of powerful and well-resourced donors predominates. Failure
to clarify their own position means that many NGOS end up simply implementing that
vision on the donors’ behalf. If doing so coincides with their own objectives, there is
no problem; but if it is an unintended outcome of lack of reflection, there is.
There is certainly not one model and one discourse for civil society.
The concept does not allow for one definition. Its very essence lies in its
diversity, difference and pluralism. Hence, the effort to meet Mr/Ms Civil
Society to begin a polished dialogue, often expressed by governments and
politicians, will never be possible. This is what distinguishes the Citizen
(and its public space), to use Marc Nerfin’s metaphor, from the Merchant
and the Prince. Civil society is multilingual and cannot be taught one
exclusive and particular language.
The compulsion of institutions is to what some term «colonize» the
language of civil society - to objectify, normatively define and
compartmentalize the concept, whereas civil society actors often see
themselves and their activities rather as a dynamic and fluid process. In
fact, as we try to demonstrate in this report, much of the critique from
international institutions, like the WTO and IMF, relates to the limitations of
«dialogue» (more prescriptively «monologue») with/about civil society is
focussed on their perception of the problem with civil society being non-
static, ungraspable and ultimately undefineable. Where is Mr/Ms Civil
Society they ask? Since no one seems to sign up, governments and
politicians constantly strive to carry out their own «civil society», expressed
by employing their own language of civil society.
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One can differentiate according to the user’s attitude quite a few
languages of civil society. Some of the most outstanding are:
The «Innovative»: The best example of this category is probably Anthony
Judge, an unnoticed language virtuoso. Other examples include John
Keane, Jan Aart Scholte, Marc Nerfin, Ronnie Lipschutz, Manuel Castells, etc.
The «Patronizing»: Most of the great intergovernmental organizations
«civil society language» belongs to this category. An outstanding example
is the IMF-initiated newsletter «Dear Friend…,» and the entire process of
«accrediting» civil society organizations as partners in dialogue. Guy
Verhofstadt’s open letter is another good example. (Verhoftstadt, 2001).
The «Radical»: Those who refuse the patronizing language and demand
real participation in dialogues and decision-making at the global level. The
best examples are the movements and networks categorized as
«absolutists» by Multi-Lateral Economic Institutions (MEIS), such as 50 Years
was Enough, Greenpeace, Jubilee 2000, Ruckus Society, etc.
The «Global Enthusiasts»: Those who speak the «pozzy» language of
Anthony Judge. Edward Comor’s «global civil society progressives»; John
Keane’s «civil society purists». There are too many to name them all.
«Civil Society Fakers»: A lucrative job for benefactors of former
authoritarian regimes who have the skills and networks to create fake
coalitions that they represent at national, European or global fora. This is
particularly evident in post-communist, feckless democracies.
The «Practical Practitioners» of the «Third Sector»: They rarely talk civil
society explicitely and show little enthusiasm for theoretical debates.
«Theoreticians of Civil Society»: Academics who do the opposite of the
practical practitioners.
The «Totalizing»: From Aristotle to Alan Greenspan, «the whole world is
civil society», including, of course uncivil society!
The «Empiricist»: «Statistics Please!». Only measurable NGOs count. The
rest is fantasy. Representatives of Americanized mainstream social sciences
literature.
«Neggies» in Anthony Judge’s classification are those who are always
sceptical. They help detect the mistakes and shortcomings of others in the
civil society literature.
There are obviously many overlaps between the users of these ways
of speaking and these categories can, of course, be extended. The
different languages used by rather influential representatives of the
above-mentioned categories are reflections of the significance of this
peculiar term and the new social, political and economic terrains it
occupies.
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Definitions and the language of civil society
Vaclav Havel understands civil society as the universality of human
rights that allow us to fulfill our potential in all of our roles: as members
of our nation, our family, our region, our church, our community,
profession, political party, and so on. In other words, by becoming citizens
«in the broadest and deepest sense of the word» (Dahrendorf, 1997: 58).
Civil society, and the organically related concept of citizenship therefore
provide a protective umbrella, a guarantee of security, an experience of
belonging, of home. Jeffrey Alexander (1998: 58) voices a similar idea:
Civil society should be conceived as a solidarity sphere in which a certain kind of
universalising community exists, it is exhibited by «public opinion», possesses its own
cultural codes and narratives in a democratic idiom, is patterned by a set of peculiar
institutions, most notably legal and journalistic ones, and is visible in historically
distinctive sets of interactional practices like civility, equality, criticism, and respect. This
kind of civil community can never exist as such; it can exist only «to one degree or
another».
The key actor of civil society is the sovereign individual who possesses
rights and responsibilities and is ready to accept the rules of cooperation
for the good of him/herself and the community, in this way sacrificing a
part of his/her own sovereignty. However, there is no complete, strong
and efficient civil society without the universal status of citizenship. It is
the set of rights and capacities related to citizenship that guarantees a
defence against anomie and protects against an over-indulgent market of
turbo-capitalism.
Dahrendorf (1997: 60) characterises citizenship as the epitome of freedom,
and civil society as the medium through which this freedom is projected,
boosted and dispersed. It thus constitutes the home of the citizen.
But citizenship and civil society go one important step further than elections and
markets. They are goals to strive for rather than dangers to avoid. In this sense they are
moral objectives […]
Alexander calls our attention to the fact that although civil society is
dependent on other spheres, the sphere of solidarity still enjoys relative
autonomy (and as such should be studied independently). He emphasizes
that civil society cannot be reduced to the realm of institutions. The world
of civil society is also the world of structured, socially constructed
conscience, «[…] a network of understandings that operates beneath and
above explicit institutions […]» (Dahrendorf, 1997: 97).
Alexander points out that the world created by the discourse is
polarized. It offers the image of open society in contrast to the model of
a closed, secret, conspiratorial world. The symbolic characteristics on the
positive side guarantee the preservation of society; the networks of
solidarity on the negative side serve the purpose of undermining mutual
respect and destroying social integration.
Language, therefore, he argues, carries with it the danger of
polarization and the creation of enemies. The questions are always the
same: Who is it that speaks in the name of civil society? Who delineates
the «insiders» and the «outsiders»? Who has access to the necessary
resources to sustain civil society?
In societies that are in the early stages of democratic development, the
danger of misunderstanding or misinterpreting the language of civil society
is especially great. On the one hand, adversaries are created through the
use of language and, on the other hand, the discourse of civil and open
democratic society is kidnapped in a way that is not civil, not open, and
not democratic.
The renaissance of civil society in East Central Europe
The great emancipatory powers of East and Central Europe needed
new ways and forms for self-expression. Michnik’s «New Evolution» and
the new language arose from strong needs that could not find proper
channels for expression. Entrapped in the ambiguities of the Realpolitik
of the Yalta system, East and Central European societies had to proceed
on a long path of learning in order to find the right language and modes
of self-organization and articulation to defend their values and identities
vis-à-vis dictatorship and authoritarian rule. Revolts and revolutions of
workers and intellectuals during the 1950s, and the more peaceful but
radical reforms «from above» that culminated in the Prague Spring in
1968, were heroic; but as far as their immediate aims are concerned they
were ineffective experiments.1 At the same time, these bitter lessons
most likely contributed a great deal to the emergence of a new
«strategy», a new vision which has materialzed in the emerging political
philosophy and the political and social practice of civil society. This
development would not have been possible without a rather gradual but
1 They all assumed a rapid and fundamental political change: the reclaiming of national independence
and the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
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nonetheless fundamental change in political thinking and goal-setting
expressed in the development of the new language of civil society.2
It is quite revealing that at another periphery, Latin America,
discussions around the same kinds of ideas were taking place
simultaneous with developments in East and Central Europe.
According to Fernando Cardoso, «In Brazilian political language,
everything which was an organized fragment was being designated
civil society. Not rigorously, but effectively, the whole opposition […]
was being described as if it were the movement of Civil Society»
(Kaldor, 2003:75).
Although no direct link can be found between intellectuals in the two
peripheries, Kaldor admits, «the term came to reflect an emerging reality
(in Latin America), which was reminiscent of the way it was used in
Central Europe». Certainly, the crossborder, transnational, European and
even global dimensions of the emerging actors who define themselves as
civil society can be traced from the beginning.
The Message of Solidarnosc and the Proliferation of the Language
of Civil Society
The lessons of the early attempts at liberation taught independent-
minded East Europeans to look for alternative methods to democratize
their regimes and increase autonomy and political, social and cultural
freedom within the stable framework of the bipolar world order. The first
alternative was the introduction of economic reforms and a cautious, state-
controlled opening towards the world economy coupled with the attempt
to avoid political change in the 1960s in Hungary. The internal
contradictions of this reform experiment reached a climax in the early
1980s and led to the end of the unwritten compromise between state and
society. The artificially maintained image of the country as an economic
success story became untenable. This was the historic turning point for
Hungarian society that then started to rid itself of political paralysis and
social muteness.
Self-mobilization from below, in different grassroots activities,
gradually emerged. With increasing recognition of the evolving political
and economic crises, the culture of silence was step-by-step replaced
with more open dialogue among formerly isolated circles of
2 Obviously, these «changes» occured in close connection and interaction with each other.
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independent-minded citizens. Cautiously, the media became involved in
the new critical discourse. The long list of taboo themes began to shrink.
In other words, a new public arena emerged to openly and critically
discuss social, environmental, cultural and, in a restricted way, political
issues. In the 1980s, a modern critical discourse of dialogue was born in
Hungary.
In Poland, Solidarnosc, quickly became a nationwide, self-supporting
political, cultural, social and economic network and a metaphor for an
emerging civil society. The political philosophers behind the movement
deliberately built their strategy on non-violence, involving the party-state
and local authorities in a dialogue with the representatives of the officially
unrecognized movement. The enforcement of dialogue, in the form of
radical demands and systematic negotiations, was tempered with the
readiness to compromise. Non-violence and strong solidarity characterized
this unique East Central European social movement. As part of a new logic
of association, expressed by a new, emerging discourse, the adjective
«civil» was reborn and referred to those characteristics. «Civil», in everyday
parlance, also meant autonomous, independent, non-military, non-violent
and non-official.
The pervasive success of Solidarnosc proved throughout the region of the
Eastern bloc that there was a chance to peacefully challenge the
authoritarian and dictatorial Soviet-type regimes and their apparatus from
below. Naturally, the forms of organizing civil movements differed from
country to country according to historical traditions, the nature of the
dictatorship, political culture and social structure. A wide variety of civil
initiatives, movements and associations emerged at the beginning of the
1980s in Hungary in the absence of a large and strong independent moral
authority like the Catholic Church in Poland which functioned as an
umbrella. At an early stage, there was a strong tendency for cooperation and
solidarity among these civil groups called «alternative social movements» or
«civil initiatives». There was a unifying and consciously shared concept of civil
society that had its origin in Hungarian political thought. István Bibó, a
prominent and independent historian and political writer, introduced the
metaphor «small circles of freedom» in one of his essays written after World
War II (WWII). This concept was then used and developed further by the
emerging student movement, the environmental and peace groups and other
civil initiatives - from populist writers to the first independent trade union.
The vision commonly shared by the alternative movements and new
civil organizations was the natural growth of these «small circles of
freedom» into interdependent networks and alliances. They gradually
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emerged during the second half of the 1980s.3 Rivalry among these groups
remained secondary to the unifying force of challenging the authorities of
the party-state.
The ideas of 1989: the origins of the concept of global civil society
Differing views of civil society in the East and Central European
Context can be summarized in the words of some of its main proponents:
According to Michael Bernhard, civil society is «a public space […]
located between official public and private life» composed of «autonomous
organizations» separated from the state by law. Bernhard, (1996: 309). For
Butterfield and Weigle «expanding independent activism increasingly
contradicted the legitimacy and power base of the single ruling party,
leading to the end of Communist rule» (Butterfield and Weigle, 1992: 1-2).
Similarly, Cohen and Arato believe that «groups, associations, and indeed
movements outside the official institutions would have the primary task of
pushing the reforms through» (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 64). In
Tismaneanu’s interpretation the «nuclei of autonomous social and cultural
initiative contributed sufficiently to the ‘smooth, non-violent change’ in
1989» (Tismaneau, 1992).
More recent evaluations of the «alternative movements» and their civil
society discourse during the 1980s provide different interpretations. Glenn
(2001: 24) talks about the «monocausal logic and conceptual imprecision
of the above mentioned interpretations»:
They obscure the impact of the Leninist regimes as repressive agents and negotiating
partners in the reconstruction of the states. These regimes were not simply overcome
by political protest led by independent groups but shaped the patterns of
reconstruction independently of the efforts of the movements. They cannot explain the
reconstruction of the state because they lack a model to explain the interaction between
states and movements that created the political institutions of post-communist states […]
They misunderstand the strategic nature of the discourse of civil society and the
conditional nature of public support for the civic movements.
3 Besides single issue movements, a whole set of colourful initiatives oriented more directly towards
actual social and political issues also came into existence. By the mid-1980s, discussion and study
circles known as the «Club Movement» and the «Movement of University Colleges» emerged around
the country. Communication and «networking» among these new groups occured naturally and
created a special spirit for civil society and dialogue. A strong feeling of solidarity and the new
experience of increasing freedom of expression released creative energies and blurred or hid
political, cultural and ideological differences between them.
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Glenn’s conclusion is that we need to reconceptualize civil society «as
a master frame with which civic movements across Eastern Europe
sought to mobilize public support in light of changing political
opportunities» (Glenn, 2001: 26-27). Glenn tends to accept Staniszkis’
evaluation that stresses continuity in East Central European societies after
1989 and sees the self-limiting strategy of social movements as rather
defensive, and not suited to fundamental social change. As Staniszkis
says (1991: 181):
It seems that from the perspective of the society the aspect of continuity is more
strongly experienced than the sense of change, and this perception itself […] may take
on the features of a self-fulfilling prophecy, inducing social apathy and feelings of
revolution for the elite only.
The literature on civil society first concentrated on the democratic
opposition movements during the Cold War, usually taking Solidarnosc as
a model and outstanding example of social self-reliance and political
resistance. But soon the concept was used for the analysis of
fundamentally different societies from the United States via the former
Soviet Union to Africa and the Far East.
Muetzelfeldt and Smith in a recent comprehensive analysis of the different
species of civil society theories have shown the one-sideness of most of the
earlier civil society approaches. Instead of biased approaches which
either over-emphasize the importance of the state or of civil society,
Muetzelfeldt and Smith (2002: 58) suggest a more balanced view:
In contrast to those who give primacy to either civil society or institutions of
governance at the global level, we emphasize their mutually emergent features, and
recognize the importance of the two-way interaction between global civil society and
governance. This mutually emergent approach emphasizes the reciprocal constitution
of a strong facilitating state and a strong civil society […].
This approach follows Kumar’s (1994: 127-130) and Walzer’s (1995)
train of thought. They stress that «Only a democratic state can create a
democratic civil society: only a democratic civil society can sustain a
democratic state» (Walzer, 1995: 170).
Muetzelfeldt and Smith (2002: 59) rightly emphasize that what they call
the «mutually emergent approach» offers a more complex understanding of
the relationship between states and civil societies.
States are not homogenous, and have contradictory features because of their
contradictory position in relationship to capital and civil society. […] This approach
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provides an analytical framework that allows for reciprocal socio-political reproduction
between state and civil society. This in turn opens the possibility for developing models
for action that build civil society and good governance through virtuous cycles of
effective active citizenship.
This more sophisticated, complex and balanced approach was
elaborated in the civil society literature by Martin Krygier (1997: 59):
Poland has a special and far-reaching significance for my themes. For it was there,
more than anywhere else, remarkably resilient, and was ultimately successful beyond
anyone’s imaginings. […] Much can be learned about civil society from the
manifestos, struggles, ambitions, and fate of Solidarnosc, from what it understood
civil society to be, and from what it failed or was uninterested to understand about
the concept […]
Krygier (1997: 64) detects the important difference between civil
society in statu nascendi and a well-established and functioning civil
society.
Civil societies depend upon distinctive configurations of economic life, civility among
acquaintances and strangers, and tolerant pluralism. These in turn depend upon
particular configurations of state and law, and gain support from particular sorts of
politics. In each of these domains, civil society has […] elements that Solidarnosc did
not have […]. Moreover, the elements interrelate. A truly civil society has a strong -
though not despotically strong - political and legal infrastructure and liberal democratic
politics.
The problem is that we don’t know where to find a «truly» civil society.
Real civil societies, as suggested by Alexander, might and should have
ideals and therefore the foundation of an ideal-type can be useful. Real
civil societies may even be measured against them, and they would
certainly feed further academic debate. Jadwiga Staniszkis (1991: 26) pulls
us back to the soil of Eastern European realities.
[…] the creation of a civil society is a much more complex process than mere political
liberalization: it demands both property rights reform and deep cultural change. It is
painful, just as is the creation of new politics occurring now in the Eastern bloc. Not
only the old, facade institutions are activated (thus is usually the first step, before new
institutions are created and oppositions recognized) but both the old and the new
elites have to resist the temptations of unlimited power. The evolution from the
situation when only society (not the ruling elite) is bound by rules to the legal
structure limiting all actors is not completed yet in the Eastern bloc; oppositional
reformers as well as «revolutionaries from above» of the old establishment
demonstrate temptation to use techniques (and philosophy) of the prerogative state
in the name of reform.
Understanding 1989
For some Western authors such as Francois Furet, Timothy Garton Ash,
and Jürgen Habermas 1989’s main characteristic was its complete lack of
innovation. Mary Kaldor agrees that the velvet revolutions of 1989 did not
produce new policies or strategies for governments, but she argues
correctly, that the period of the 1980s, preceding the velvet or negotiated
revolutions, was foment with ideas.
Indeed, thanks to the movements and networking of the pre-1989
period, a new understanding of citizenship and civil society as well as
«transnationalism» was born. Kaldor claims that «the notion of European or
global civil society, which could be said to have emerged during this
period, in some sense encompassed or encapsulated this strand of
thinking» (Kaldor, 2003: 50).
As suggested earlier, East Central European dissidents and independent
intellectuals and activists digested the lessons of 1956 and drew new
conclusions by the late 1970s and early 1980s. The new way of thinking
in East Central Europe represented by Michnik, Kuron, Konrad, Havel,
among others, regarding the relationship between an oppressive
authoritarian state on the one hand, and society on the other, contributed
greatly to political and theoretical conceptualization.
From the outbreak of the 1956 revolution onwards, there was
permanent tension between the non-acceptance of Soviet domination and
the logic of the bipolar world system throughout the region. Original and
effective ways were found to democratize and support the building of a
new relationship with the political ruling class. After the failures of 1956
and 1968, Solidarnosc proved efficient and victorious. It revitalized and
reformulated the concept of civil society.
On the other hand, the change in thinking and acting in civil society
was supported by powerful «external» international trends as well. The
1975 Helsinki Accord’s third basket on Human Rights helped Charta 77 in
Czechoslovakia, KOR in Poland, and the democratic opposition in Hungary
to act more openly not only within their societies, but also with each other.
At the core of these ideas and analyses, there was a strong belief that
events could proceed in new, historically unprecedented ways. Terms and
phrases of a new language, like «parallel polis» and the «power of the
powerless», surfaced in the new discourse of Charta 77. This new
vocabulary expressed a new way of thinking, and a new attitude towards
the weakening authoritarian regimes. Vaclav Benda emphasized that the
«parallel polis» does not compete with power, and accordingly Charta 77
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was seen not as a political movement, but as a «civic initiative». In short,
the new language signalled a new type of politics from below.
The birth of the new language and new thinking was primarily
restricted to the national level, but there were also promising crossborder
civil initiatives. There was regular cooperation between East Central
European opposition groups and alternative movements in order to
strengthen each others’ cases and support each others’ activities. (Kaldor,
1997: 8). This risky and unprecedented enterprise produced a growing
regional, i.e., Central European, awareness of a shared and common
identity that strengthened solidarity. There was not only cooperation
among the main democratic oppositional movements, but also among
smaller movements and groups, like environmentalists, peace activists and
professional circles. In order to protect the emerging civil society and its
new social movements throughout East Central Europe, Vaclav Havel,
suggested to establish an alternative European Parliament for social
movements which became the Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly.4
Kaldor draws our attention to the fact that the emergence of social
movements and citizen groups was global. The «growth of small circles of
freedom» (Solidarnosc, Charta 77, Swords into Ploughshares (GDR), the
Dialogue Groups, Wolnosc i Pokuj, the Danube Circle, Fidesz, etc.) did not
occur in isolation. The 1980s also saw the re-emergence of strong and
dynamic social movements in the West. This was an expression of the
need to radicalize democracy and of the emergence of a new public
sphere. Together with the birth of a new language, East-West dialogue
began in Europe and reflected a hitherto unprecedented global
consciousness and responsibility. In 1985, Havel (1990) wrote:
It seems to be that all of us, East and West, face one fundamental task from which all
else will follow. That task is one of resisting vigilantly, […] but at the same time with
total dedication, […] the irrational momentum of anonymous, impersonal and inhuman
power – the power of ideologies, systems, bureaucracy, artificial languages, and
political slogans.
East-West dialogue certainly expanded the space for a new European
and global public for East and Central European movements, which
successfully filled up the new public space. The artificial division of Europe,
its military and bureaucracy became unacceptable to younger generations
4 The Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (HCA), established in 1990 in Prague, is the only international and
institutional offspring of efforts to create civil networks across borders in the 1980s. It reveals a
significant continuity in the protection of human rights and support for local grassroots initiatives.
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that had not witnessed the terror of the 1950s. For them, the new language
and thinking was a natural given. Suddenly a new Zeitgeist, a new «feeling»,
began to dominate the discourse of the 1980s. The attitude: «I have the right
to make my voice heard» characterized not only the rather weak peace
movement in East Central Europe but also clubs, student organizations and
environmental groups. It was exactly this common feeling that bound them
together and created a common language for civil society.
This corresponds with Marc Nerfin’s prediction about the growing
importance of the citizen and the general mood of protest in other parts of
the world. Despite widely different political and cultural contexts, there was
a fundamental consensus among the participants of the East-West dialogue
that one could no longer remain silent on fundamental political, social and
ecological issues. The new language became the common denominator for
all of these public concerns and provided the loose, rather psychological
connections among members of independent civil movements and initiatives.
Kaldor also argues that the Western peace movement contributed
«transnationalism in practice» to the new discourse of the emerging Central
European civil world. END and the European Network of East-West Dialogue
demonstrated that networks can be effective and that crossborder
networking is not only possible but fruitful in terms of protest, defense of
human rights and the elaboration of new concepts and ideas. It is also
remarkable that concepts such as empowerment, participation, deliberation,
transnational and European public sphere, or global civil society were born
in the mid-1980s. All these concepts, ideas and phrases then became objects
of academic research and a new language of power in the 1990s. Curiously
enough, there is very little investigation of and interest in their recent origin
(Kaldor, 1991) (Muetzenfeldt and Smith, 2002).
After 1989: institutionalized democracy and the linguistic turn
in the civil society discourse
The rapid establishment of new institutions of representative democracy
radically changed the dynamics of civil society. An overwhelming majority of
former civil society activists became members of the new political elite and
occupied the highest positions of leadership in the new institutions and
political parties. Accordingly, their perception of civil society versus state
relations changed dramatically. The leaders and the ideologues of the new
political elite claimed that the time for social movements was over. They
stated that grassroots mobilization was unnecessary, if not down right
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dangerous for new democracies. Political parties provided an efficient arena
for the competition of ideas, ideologies and social-political alternatives.
According to this neo-liberal and at the same time etatist credo, the everyday
political participation of citizens is unnecessary. Their role should be
restricted to maintaining the new institutions and to legitimizing the political
regime by voting every four years in «fair and unharrassed elections».
Alan Fowler (1996) identifies civil society as the place where interest
groups turn themselves into political parties, competing to become the
ruling regime. In the case of East Central European countries, one has to
alter this general truth according to the special socio-economic and historic
context. A gap developed historically between the rulers and the ruled due
to the lack of a strong middle class who, after the phase of saturation of
wealth, would act as donors and support the social and cultural sphere. In
the absence of a strong democratic culture, the values of solidarity, social
responsibility and citizenship could not develop. Citizens view themselves
and were indoctrinated to view themselves as helpless, exposed subjects at
the mercy of the state and its authorities. For good historical reasons,
citizens (who are still called «state-burghers» after the German Staatsbürger)
and official authorities were – and in many transition countries still are –
mutually suspicious of each other. This special relationship between the
rulers and the ruled is important to recognize in order to form a realistic
picture of the present state of civil society in East Central Europe.
Although this attitude towards power started to change in the transition
period, the survival of paternalistic and authoritarian elements are significant
determinants of the relationship between civil society and the political elite.
The attitude that «it was always like this and will always remain this way –
so what can I do?» which characterized post-WW II East Central European
societies was challenged by the new social movements of the 1980s. But
after the first democratic elections in 1990, the new government and the
political elite, did their best to restore old clichés and attitudes. Continuity is
strong in public institutional life. The restoration of authoritarian patterns of
behaviour, between citizens and their institutions, remains tenacious.
The NGO world and NGO language
The breakdown of the communist party-states in East Central Europe,
coupled with the retreat of the welfare states in the West, naturally gave
birth to NGOS both in theory and practice. The negative definition of NGOS,
similar to terms like «post-communism» or «post-Cold War» refers to the lack
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of something, to the uncertainty and unpredictability of the transitory
epoch. This situation is naturally comprised of positive tendencies as well
like the further articulation of the need for social democratization and
participation of citizens in decision-making by civil societies. NGOS could
play a vital role in buttressing and facilitating social democratization and
citizen participation. This is far from guaranteed, however. In many cases,
NGOS are not genuine agents of authentic civil society. In weak and
feckless democracies they are often creatures of governments, politics or
individuals who employ them to enhance their power, prestige and
material interests (Jensen and Miszlivetz, 1998).
One of the main problems with the new NGOS, in East and Central Europe
and other «underdeveloped» parts of the world, is their lack of legitimacy in
the local societies. The legitimacy problem stems from the scarcity of
resources and local donors. NGOS either turn to the state, automatically
loosing their independence, or look for external resources. In both cases
accountability and transparency become questionable. It is also very often
the case that western (mostly American) donors, sometimes with the best
motives, have not analyzed local, social, political and cultural conditions and
are therefore unable to select the most appropriate civil society partners. In
many cases those who receive internal financial support are those who are
already in the external circle of a global NGO elite. They possess not only the
necessary language, internet and application-writing skills, but are able to
«talk civil society» fluently using the most trendy and exclusive pseudo-
professional and fashionable buzzwords (ONGOS, DONGOS, PONGOS, etc.)
On the other hand, East Central European NGO and CSO (Civil Society
Organization) development reveals a consciousness about their role in
strengthening democratic values, mobilizing society for participation, and
contributing to a new civil culture of decision-making and dialogue. This
is required to strengthen the bargaining capacity with authorities on local,
national and international levels, but this is also not a given. Lars Jorgensen
(1996: 36) formulated this precisely:
There are some risks in taking on civil society. It is of course perfectly legitimate for
NGOS not to be openly political or to take sides in whatever constellation of parties or
factions which is forming at a given moment, but they must recognize that their work
has political aspects and relate to the authority of the state and to the political
development of their society.
An unbalanced and undemocratic relationship, based on a new
dependency between western donors and eastern NGOS can seriously
undermine and bias this potential. Therefore, a critical assessment of their
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relationship and its development during the transition period is of crucial
importance. Sometimes well-intentioned donors superimpose their values or
policies on recipients who then act rather as dependent agents than genuine
actors of their local civil sphere. The scarcity of domestic resources, a
growing dependency on state support and an uneven, dependent
relationship with western donors, combined with a growing rivalry rather
than solidarity among NGOS, has seriously undermined the spirit of an
independent civil society in transition countries. This tendency is reinforced
by the emergence of a global and local NGO elite with high technical skills
and «networking capital» that contributes to the fake image of a civil society
constructed from above, a frequent characteristic of feckless democracies.
From Dialogue to Cooptation
Civil society, with its proliferating interfaces, provides a remarkable asset
for the global, regional and domestic representatives and configurations of
the new postmodern Prince and Merchant to approve and demonstrate
their «good intentions». With the help of this newspeak, «talking civil
society» and nominating and signifying «civil society» they themselves
become part of civil society: «We are working towards the same goals, but
with different means». The slippery language and the new praxis of
«dialogue with civil society organizations» initiated by non-CSOs (from above
or from the outside) dissolves sharp contradictions and antagonisms. Civil
society speak can smoothly annihilate diametrically opposing interests and
provide results for «mutual satisfaction». This process we call the
«cooptation of civil society», a danger and tendency Marc Nerfin has also
referred to.
«Talking civil society» provides the common denominator for western
donors, the new NGO-elite, and national governments who want to coopt
them. It can be lucrative to display the «right» liberal democratic values and
at the same time avoid the uncomfortable consequences of strong and
genuine civil societies. Coopting and overtaking means surpassing and
weakening. A new network of dependent NGOs undermines not serves the
interest of genuine civil society.
However important and inevitable the institutionalization of civil
society is, we can only move beyond the practical and theoretical impass
if we assume that civil society is not equivalent to the sum total of NGOs.
The permanent slipping between the terms «civil society» and «NGO» is a
source of theoretical inconsistency, practical misunderstanding and
political or ideological manipulation.
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The lack of trust: weak civil societies in feckless democracies
If we accept Jeffrey Alexander’s conceptualisation, that civil society can
be viewed as the universal expression of social solidarity, we might also
say that without trust there is no civil society. In East Central Europe,
illusions rapidly vanished at the beginning of the 1990s. The central values
of civil society were quickly marginalized. In an unpublished manuscript,
Alexander (1998: 1-2) observed the following:
Just when intellectuals in Poland and Hungary were celebrating the return of civil
society as an idea […] they are not at all sure they want it […] The practical task of
social reconstruction makes these social ideals difficult for the intellectuals to sustain.
Amidst the joy of bringing down the communist state everything indeed
seemed «civil». Numerous institutions and movements took up the adjective
«civil». Borislaw Geremek said in August of 1989: «we don’t need to define
civil society, we see it and feel it» (Smolar, 1996: 24). Jiri Dienstbier’s famous
formulation, that «civil society is in power» quickly became ironic. The
former spokesman for Charta 77 was certainly correct in observing the great
stream of former «dissidents» towards positions of power.
With the formation of political parties, however, civil society really lost
its moral constituting power. The new political elite believed that moral
civil society, along with its movements, had fulfilled its destiny, and should
now stop stirring-up the waters – some even stepped forward openly
against the idea of civil society. Vaclav Klaus went so far as calling it a
perverted idea, seeing in it the ideology of collectivism and an ambiguous
third way.
In short, civil society went through a real metamorphosis after 1989.
Certain parts of it disappeared altogether; others were transformed, several
movements turned themselves into political parties; local initiatives either
faded away, or were coopted by local politics, and many civil
organisations were forced to sell themselves in a financial or political sense
to survive. A desperate struggle awaited those who managed to preserve
their identity: they needed time, willpower, money and expertise to
continue to operate. In the meantime, a process of disintegration and
atomization rather than civilization swept the region of East Central
Europe. Elemér Hankiss, as Smolar (1996: 34) quotes, observes:
Millions of people have lost, or fear that they may lose, their traditional roles and
positions in the sphere of production and distribution. They have lost their way in the
labyrinths of social and industrial relationships, which are in the midst of a chaotic
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transformation. People no longer know what the rules of the new game are, what their
duties and rights are, what they have to do for what, what is the cost and reward of
what? There is no authority to tell them; there are no values to refer to.
During the last decade sociological literature - especially in Poland and
Hungary - has repeatedly called attention to the continuity in institutional
and social mentality. Aleksander Smolar speaks directly of a new «socialist
civil society». «Shadow society» is the term he uses to describe the
collection of informal social relations that were created by people in the
1970s and 1980s to defend themselves from the existing form of socialism
(Smolar, 1996: 35-38). These informal networks of social cooperation
contributed greatly to the acceptance of shock therapy and the initial
hardships of the transition. In time, however, as enthusiasm for «a return
to Europe» receded and the pain caused by the reforms intensified, the
emphasis shifted to the defence of material interests. The re-strengthening
of the antiliberal, etatist hierarchy of values came together with a
nostalgia for the socialist state that had offered a certain kind of
protection and security. The effects this had on Hungarian and Polish
political and social life are well-known. In societies that have uncertain
futures, democratic politics with half-established and not entirely
accepted rules and practices frequently deter or alienate rather than
attract the majority. Informality, a hotbed for corruption, e.g., the trust
invested in informal family relationships and close ties of friendships then
gain weight.
Smolar calls this phenomenon the irony of history that real socialism
found refuge precisely in the very world of civil society that it had
previously sought to strangle. Even though this phenomenon is not
characteristic of the ever-changing sphere of civil societies in East Central
Europe as a whole, it reveals a number of deep contradictions that
determine social values and personal life strategies. The presence of trust
at the social level provides the basis for order and dependability. After a
short-lived rise in social trust, cooperation and solidarity, the societies of
democratising East Central Europe are once again characterised by distrust
and a strong tendency towards atomization.
In the post-Cold War period the challenge for civil societies in East
Central European countries is twofold: globalization and European
integration. In order to address these challenges, local NGOS and CSOS have
to link their domestic activities to the global – or at least regional –
context. Escaping from their narrow and parochial framework and
political climate, they need to find donors who are able to cooperate as
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partners and equals with commonly shared values and goals. Networking
is already very much present, but its full potential has not been utilized.
In the second half of the 1980s, it did not seem illusory that East-West
dialogue would lead to the sustained cooperation of civil society which
would strengthen autonomous, democratic social space in the East and
revitalize democracy in the West. After the 1989 transformations,
however, the situation changed fundamentally. With the disappearance
of the bipolar logic of the Yalta world order, the common foundation
for wide social mobilisation also disappeared. Opinions on the unity of
Europe were too divided. Once the main political and ideological
barriers fell, economic, welfare and security concerns came to the
forefront. In contrast to unconvincing rhetoric, the reality showed that
the western half of Europe was turning its attention inwards. It
cautiously closed itself off, while in the eastern half fragmentation and
disintegration became the main features. The concept and language of
civil society did not altogether disappear, but it went through a
metamorphosis in comparison to the practice and visions of the 1980s
(Jensen and Miszlivetz, 1998: 141-170).
Increasingly professionalized civil organizations and NGOs replaced
bottom-up initiatives and movements. In places where the ethos and
mentality of civil society was preserved from the 1980s, it was either
incapacitated against nationalist tyranny (as in several republics of the
former Yugoslavia), or it was pushed into the background as in Hungary,
Poland and former Czechoslovakia.
A new world was created by the mid-1990s: the world of professional
NGOS, civil organisations and foundations. Most of these NGOS took over
some of the responsibilities of the state, and they do not have
particularly warm feelings about the civil ethos or new forms of
cooperation. Those civil organisations, however, who carry out their
work in the fields of human rights, minority questions, education,
culture and the protection of the environment, have every right to
regard themselves as institutions of civil society. Most of these have
integrated into international – predominantly Eastern or Western
European – networks, as a result of which their weight and ability to
survive have increased considerably. In the second half of the 1990s, the
symptoms of fragmentation and inward-lookingness also seem to have
diminished. The idea of regional cooperation may gain modest
influence in the civil sphere, as we witness similar signs on the political
stage.
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